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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
This case involves an appeal and a cross appeal from a 
judgment of $3,005,941 entered on a jury's verdict in favor 
of the plaintiff, Mark Waldorf, after a deduction for a 
collateral source recovery, in this personal injury action. 
Waldorf suffered injuries rendering him a quadriplegic in a 
motor vehicle accident in 1982 when he was 24 years old. 
First, Waldorf appeals from the denial of his motion for a 
new trial on damages and the refusal of the district court 
to grant him an additur as he contends that the verdict was 
inadequate and against the weight of the evidence. Second, 
Waldorf argues that he should receive a new trial based on 
the district court's improper qualification of a witness as an 
expert and based on the allegedly improper conduct of 
defense counsel during the trial. Defendant, Borough of 
Kenilworth, New Jersey ("the Borough"), contends, however, 
that we do not have jurisdiction over Waldorf 's appeal, 
because the district court has not entered a final judgment. 
In a cross appeal, the Borough also argues that the district 
court improperly bound it to a stipulation of liability to 
Waldorf that it made prior to an earlier trial, and that the 
court also erred in limiting a collateral source set-off 
against the jury's award. We hold that we have jurisdiction 
over this appeal and cross appeal and will affirm the 
district court's orders. 
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This appeal is the third occasion that this case has been 
before us during the over 13 years that it has been litigated 
in the federal courts. See Waldorf v. Shuta, 3 F.3d 705 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Waldorf v. Shuta, 896 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Although our prior opinions relate the circumstances 
surrounding this case, we set forth the facts again because 
of their relevance to the present appeal. 
 
On November 17, 1982, at approximately 11:45 p.m., 
Waldorf was involved in a two-car accident at the four-way 
intersection of Monroe Avenue and North 14th Street in the 
Borough. He was a passenger in a van driven by Kenneth 
C. Spence, Jr., and was riding on a seat that was not bolted 
down, but instead was secured only by elastic straps. 
Waldorf was not wearing a seat belt at the time of the 
accident. 
 
The intersection of Monroe Avenue and North 14th Street 
had only one traffic light facing in each direction. On the 
night of the accident, the red light facing west at the 
intersection failed. Corporal Victor Smith of the Kenilworth 
Police Department discovered at approximately 11:00 p.m. 
that the red light was not working. He attempted tofix the 
light; but he could not repair it, nor could he switch it into 
the blinking mode. Smith radioed police headquarters and 
discussed the situation with his supervisor, Lieutenant 
Joseph Rego. However, instead of ordering an officer to 
direct traffic at the intersection, Rego assigned Smith and 
the other officer on duty to what he regarded as more 
pressing matters. 
 
At approximately 11:45 p.m. that night, Spence was 
traveling south on 14th Street. Edward J. Shuta, driving a 
Datsun Sedan, was traveling at approximately 60 miles per 
hour heading east on Monroe Avenue at the same time. The 
green light was facing Spence, and he proceeded into the 
intersection at approximately 20-25 miles per hour. Shuta 
testified that he saw a green light when he was crossing 
railroad tracks 237 feet from the intersection. However, he 
did not see the light turn yellow, nor did he notice that the 
red light was not working. Thus, he entered the intersection 
at the same time as Spence, and the vehicles collided. The 
force of the collision threw Waldorf from his seat, and the 
bench upon which he had been sitting struck his head. 
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Waldorf was taken to Memorial Hospital in Union, New 
Jersey, where neurosurgeon Dr. Howard Lieberman 
diagnosed that he had a fracture and dislocation at the C6- 
C7 level of the spine with a transection of the spinal cord 
and a total lack of function below that level resulting in 
quadriplegia. See app. at 129-31. While Waldorf was at the 
hospital, Dr. Lieberman initially treated him with cervical 
traction to reduce the fracture in the cervical spine, and Dr. 
Lieberman later fitted him with a halo brace, which was 
screwed into his skull to help his neck fractures heal. 
Waldorf remained in the hospital for three weeks and then 
transferred to the Kessler Institute for Rehabilitation in 
West Orange, New Jersey, where he began a rehabilitation 
program, physical therapy, and occupational therapy. 
 
In March 1983, Waldorf transferred to the Rusk Institute 
for Rehabilitation at New York University Medical Center. At 
Rusk, Waldorf came under the care of Dr. Kristjan 
Ragnarsson, a board certified physician who specializes in 
physical medicine and rehabilitation. Waldorf received 
physical therapy, occupational therapy, counseling by 
social workers and psychologists, vocational counseling, 
and therapeutic recreation. See id. at 142-50. Ultimately, 
Waldorf was discharged on December 23, 1983. In all, 
Waldorf spent 404 days at Memorial Hospital, Kessler 
Institute, and Rusk Institute. Upon discharge, Waldorf 
continued under Dr. Ragnarsson's care as an outpatient. 
For a time, Waldorf was under the care of Dr. Asa Ruskin, 
a physical medicine specialist at Kinsgbrook Jewish Medical 
Center, but he returned to Dr. Ragnarsson's care in April 
1991, after Dr. Ruskin's death. 
 
Waldorf 's injuries as a result of this accident are 
catastrophic. He has lost control of all motor, muscle, and 
sensory functions below the C6-C7 neurological level. 
Waldorf can move his facial, neck, and shoulder muscles 
and can raise and bend his elbow; but he cannot move his 
fingers. Although his chest muscles are paralyzed, he is 
able to breath without a respirator. Waldorf has lost a great 
deal of weight and muscle mass as a result of his condition. 
In order to combat this problem, Waldorf undergoes a 45- 
minute stretching and exercise program twice a day and 
engages in bicycle riding therapy for two hours a day. The 
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muscles in his legs are spastic, resulting in involuntarily 
contractions and motions of his legs. 
 
Waldorf has no control over his bowel functions, which 
have to be stimulated artificially on a daily basis. Since 
1985, he has been under the care of Dr. Joshua Feibusch, 
a gastroenterologist, for this problem. Furthermore, Waldorf 
has no control over his urinary functions, so he has to wear 
an external urinary collection unit. This situation has led to 
several urinary tract infections, one of which required a 
nine-day hospital stay. Among other medical problems, 
Waldorf suffers from autonomic dysreflexia, sexual 
disfunction, and musculoskeletal problems. He has had 
and will require 24-hour attendant care for the rest of his 
life. Throughout his ordeal, Waldorf has suffered from a 
great amount of pain. 
 
Waldorf filed this action in the district court on 
September 21, 1984, against the drivers of the vehicles 
involved in the accident, the Borough, and various present 
and former Borough officials. At the first trial, which was 
on both liability and damages, he received a jury verdict on 
August 12, 1988, against the Borough, Police Lt. Rego, and 
the drivers of the vehicles in the amount of $8,400,000. We 
subsequently reversed and remanded the case for a new 
trial. See Waldorf, 896 F.2d at 744-45. 
 
On remand, the Borough proposed to stipulate its 
liability to Waldorf in exchange for certain procedural 
concessions. Counsel for the Borough made this proposal 
at a hearing before a magistrate judge stating: 
 
       The borough has, after much consideration and soul- 
       searching, has authorized me to advise the Court that 
       they will not contest liability in this matter, provided 
       two things, and these are absolute conditions for this 
       admission by them: One is that the case be bifurcated 
       and different juries hear liability and damages; and the 
       second thing is that the damages trial proceed first 
       before a liability trial. Therefore, a decision not to 
       contest liability is predicated on those two 
       prerequisites. 
 
App. at 277. Waldorf 's counsel objected to this stipulation, 
but the magistrate judge nevertheless incorporated the 
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stipulation by reference into an order of August 4, 1992. 
See id. at 292. Pursuant to this order, the case was tried 
only on damages leading to the jury returning a verdict on 
September 25, 1992, for Waldorf in the amount of 
$16,135,716. The Borough sought and obtained a Rule 
54(b) certification of the judgment and then filed an appeal. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). We again reversed and remanded 
the case for a new trial on damages. See Waldorf , 3 F.3d at 
713. 
 
After the second remand, the Borough retained new 
counsel who moved in the district court for relief from its 
stipulation of liability. The district court denied the motion 
and held that the stipulation bound the Borough. See 
Waldorf v. Borough of Kenilworth, 878 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 
1995). The Borough then unsuccessfully sought permission 
to appeal the decision. 
 
The court then held a third trial, which like the second 
trial, was only on damages. On October 25, 1995, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of Waldorf in the amount of 
$3,086,500 divided as follows: $2,500,000 for pain and 
suffering; $195,000 for past lost earnings; and $391,500 for 
future lost earnings. The district court entered judgment 
against the Borough on November 8, 1995, following which 
Waldorf moved for a new trial on damages, or in the 
alternative, for a substantial additur. The district court 
denied this motion on February 26, 1996. See Waldorf v. 
Shuta, 916 F. Supp. 423 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 
Waldorf then moved for a Rule 54(b) certification for entry 
of a final judgment against the Borough, and the Borough 
filed a cross-motion for an order setting a date for the 
liability trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The Borough also 
filed a motion seeking a collateral source set-off as provided 
by N.J. Stat. Ann. S 59:9-2(e) (West 1992). Pursuant to Rule 
54(b), the district court certified the judgment so that it 
could be appealed and, by doing so, denied the Borough's 
motion to set a trial date on liability. The court, however, 
did not file a written opinion with its order explaining why 
it entered the final judgment. As part of this same order, 
the court granted in part the Borough's motion for a 
collateral source set-off and reduced the judgment to 
$3,005,941. 
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Waldorf then filed a timely notice of appeal, and the 
Borough filed a cross appeal. On December 5, 1996, we 
entered an order dismissing the appeals "for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction," citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Waldorf 
filed a second motion with the district court for a 
certification of a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). The 
district court subsequently issued a written opinion and 
order on March 24, 1997, again granting Waldorf 's 
certification motion. See Waldorf v. Borough of Kenilworth, 
959 F. Supp. 675 (D.N.J. 1997). 
 
On April 3, 1997, Waldorf again appealed. Kenneth C. 
Spence, Jr., Mary Kay Spence, Edward Shuta, and Carolyn 
Wood also filed notices of appeal, but they later withdrew 
their appeals. The Borough filed a cross appeal and, in 
addition, filed a motion to dismiss Waldorf 's appeal for 
want of jurisdiction. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1332(a), based on the diversity of citizenship 
among the parties. However, the Borough asserts that we 
do not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 because in 
its view the district court improperly certified the judgment 
as a final order pursuant to Rule 54(b). We will address this 
jurisdictional question first. 
 
A district court's determination to grant a Rule 54(b) 
certification motion is "predicated on its affirmative answer 
to two questions, i.e., were the judgments final and were 
they ready for appeal." Gerardi v. Pelullo , 16 F.3d 1363, 
1368 (3d Cir. 1994). In reviewing the district court's 
decision regarding whether a judgment is final, we exercise 
a plenary standard of review. See id. In this appeal, the 
question of finality involves the district court's 
interpretation of the stipulation of liability that the Borough 
made prior to the second trial. In reviewing the district 
court's interpretation of that stipulation we also exercise 
plenary review.1 See Washington Hosp. v. White, 889 F.2d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Arguably this case involves construction rather than, or perhaps in 
addition to, interpretation of the stipulation; but as we discern no 
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1294, 1299 (3d Cir. 1989). With respect to the question of 
whether the issue was "ready for appeal . . . tak[ing] into 
account judicial administrative interests as well as the 
equities involved," we exercise an abuse of discretion 
standard of review. Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1368 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Thus, we will exercise a plenary 
standard of review to consider the district court's 
interpretation of the Borough's stipulation and the district 
court's determination of the finality of this judgment, but 
will use an abuse of discretion standard to review the 
district court's determination that this judgment was "ready 
for appeal" under Rule 54(b). 
 
A. District Court Determination 
 
In an opinion dated March 24, 1997, the district court 
certified the judgment as final under Rule 54(b) in order to 
permit an immediate appeal. See Waldorf, 959 F. Supp. at 
682. The district court noted that following the third trial, 
it first had certified the judgment under Rule 54(b) without 
an opinion, but that we dismissed the appeal "for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction," citing Rule 54(b). See id. at 677-78. 
The district court recognized that the dismissal could imply 
that an appeal was not appropriate at that point in the 
litigation; however, the district court determined that we 
more likely dismissed the appeal because the court failed to 
state its reasons for its certification of the judgment as 
final. See id. at 678. Thus, having determined it would be 
appropriate to reconsider the certification motion in a 
written opinion, the court addressed its merits. 
 
The court recognized that to certify an order pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), the judgment must be final and there must be 
no just reason for delay in entering the final judgment. 
With regard to the question of finality, the court held that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
difference in outcome turning on that distinction, as a matter of 
convenience we use the term "interpretation." In this regard, we are not 
prejudicing the Borough as we are exercising plenary review in 
answering all questions which could be regarded as involving either 
interpretation or construction of the stipulation. This standard of review 
is, of course, favorable to the Borough. 
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the judgment was final, because "it is an `ultimate 
disposition' of Waldorf 's individual claim for damages 
against [the] Borough." Id. at 679. The Borough had 
conceded its liability; and on that basis, the jury 
determined that Waldorf was entitled to damages from the 
Borough. The court also held that while the Borough 
claimed that it could assert the affirmative defense of 
comparative negligence against Waldorf, this assertion 
would not preclude a finding of finality; instead, the court 
determined that if the Borough had such a defense, it was 
merely a factor for the court to consider in the delay 
analysis and thus did not affect finality. Therefore, the 
court held that the judgment was final under Rule 54(b). 
 
Having made a finding of finality, the court considered 
whether there was any just reason for delay. Under this 
analysis, courts should consider the following factors: 
 
       (1) the presence or absence of a claim or counterc laim 
       which could result in a set-off against the judgment 
       sought to be made final; (2) the relationship be tween 
       the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (3) the 
       possibility that the need for review might or might not 
       be mooted by future developments in the district court; 
       (4) the possibility that the reviewing court might  be 
       obliged to consider the same issue a second time; and 
       (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and 
       solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, 
       frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like. 
 
Id. at 679 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. 
Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975) (footnotes omitted)). 
With regard to the first factor, the court recognized that the 
existence of an affirmative defense would weigh heavily 
against the grant of a certification. As part of the liability 
trial, the Borough argued that it intended to raise an 
affirmative defense of comparative negligence against 
Waldorf. However, Waldorf claimed that the Borough waived 
this defense when it stipulated to liability prior to the 
second trial. The district court examined the circumstances 
surrounding the liability stipulation, and found that the 
Borough made no explanation at that time regarding the 
specific scope of the waiver nor did it express any intent to 
preserve any affirmative defense. See id. at 679-80. Thus, 
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these circumstances weighed in favor of finding a waiver of 
the comparative negligence defense. 
 
The court also rejected the Borough's argument that its 
opening remarks at the second trial evidenced its intent not 
to waive its affirmative defense. In these remarks, counsel 
for the Borough stated that "[t]he Borough, in fact, has said 
it is at least in part responsible for this tragic event." Id. at 
680. According to the Borough, this statement 
demonstrated that it believed that it had maintained its 
affirmative defense of comparative negligence against 
Waldorf. The court rejected this argument, noting that the 
statement "is consistent with the understanding that the 
liability phase of the trial was to treat the cross-claims 
asserted by the Borough against the other defendants." Id. 
Thus, the court held that the statement did not imply that 
the Borough had preserved its affirmative defense against 
Waldorf. 
 
As further support for its decision, the court noted that 
following the second trial, the Borough was in the same 
procedural position in which Waldorf found himself after 
the third trial -- appealing under a Rule 54(b) certification 
on damages prior to a liability trial. Yet when the Borough 
appealed, it did not mention its affirmative defense and 
instead proceeded with its appeal. Based on all of this 
evidence, the court determined that the Borough's 
stipulation of liability precluded its assertion of an 
affirmative defense of comparative negligence against 
Waldorf. 
 
Additionally, the court held that permitting the Borough 
to litigate the issue of Waldorf 's comparative negligence 
would "run afoul of the principles underlying New Jersey's 
`ultimate outcome' rule." Id. (citing Roman v. Mitchell, 413 
A.2d 322 (N.J. 1980)). In Roman, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that " `a jury in a comparative negligence 
situation should be given an ultimate outcome charge so 
that its deliberations on percentages of negligence will not 
be had in a vacuum, or possibly based on a mistaken 
notion of how the [comparative negligence] statute works.' " 
Id. at 681 (quoting Roman, 413 A.2d at 327). Thus, in order 
to make an appropriate determination, a jury is entitled to 
know that any award to a plaintiff will be reduced by the 
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plaintiff 's negligence and, indeed, that a plaintiff 's 
negligence, if exceeding that of the defendant, will bar his 
claim entirely. The court noted that if the Borough was 
permitted to argue comparative negligence, "one jury will 
have decided the amount of Waldorf 's total damages and a 
second jury may quantify, by percentage, his fault." Id. The 
court held that the damages jury, therefore, would have 
operated in the vacuum that Roman sought to avoid. Based 
on all of these arguments, the court held that the Borough 
waived its affirmative defense of comparative negligence. 
Therefore, the first factor in determining whether there was 
just reason for delay, i.e., the possibility of a set-off by 
reason of a counterclaim, weighed in favor of certification 
as there was no such possibility. 
 
In considering the second factor relating to whether there 
was just reason for delay in entering a final judgment, the 
district court found that all of the unadjudicated claims in 
this case addressed the issue of liability among the 
defendants. The Borough had conceded its liability to 
Waldorf, so all that remained was a determination of 
whether to allocate responsibility for the damages judgment 
among the remaining defendants. Because a certification of 
this judgment would not impair the Borough's right to seek 
contribution from the other defendants, the court held that 
this factor did not weigh against certification. See id. at 
681. 
 
Considering the possibility of mootness and of multiple 
reviews factors, the district court held that "[i]t is highly 
unlikely that the litigation of the Borough's cross-claims on 
the basis of liability would serve to moot the issue of the 
propriety of the jury verdict" with regard to damages. Id. 
Furthermore, the court recognized that another jury would 
not redetermine the quantum of damages so that we would 
address the damage issue only on this occasion. Therefore, 
the district court determined that these factors did not 
weigh against certification. See id. at 681-82. 
 
Finally, in considering the miscellaneous factors, the 
district court held that the consequences of a delay in the 
review of this verdict weighed in favor of immediate 
certification and review. The court recognized that Waldorf 
had been injured more than 14 years earlier, and had not 
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received any compensation from this case. Without a 
certification, the unjustified delay would continue. The 
court also held that economic and solvency considerations 
were immaterial, determining that they played no role. See 
id. at 682. 
 
Because it determined that the judgment was final and 
the factors weighed in favor of finding that there was no 
just reason for delay in the entry of a final judgment, the 
district court held that certification was proper under Rule 
54(b). 
 
B. Discussion 
 
The court's authority to certify a judgment under Rule 
54(b) as final creates a narrow exception to the historic 
policy of the federal appellate courts against piecemeal 
appeals. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 
U.S. 427, 438, 76 S.Ct. 895, 901 (1956); Braswell 
Shipyards, Inc. v. Beazer East, Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th 
Cir. 1993). Rule 54(b) provides: 
 
       When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
       action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, 
       or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are 
       involved, the court may direct the entry of a final 
       judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the 
       claims or parties only upon an express determination 
       that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
       express direction for the entry of judgment. . . . 
 
Thus, to certify entry of a final judgment under this rule in 
a multiple claim or multiple party action, the district court 
must determine expressly that the judgment is final and 
that there is no just reason for delay. 
 
Initially on this point we state that the district court 
correctly understood that we based our dismissal of the 
earlier appeal and cross appeal on the district court's 
failure to state its reasons for certification on the record. 
We consistently have required district courts to provide a 
reasoned opinion as a prerequisite for appellate review of a 
judgment certified as final. See, e.g., Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan 
Motor Corp., 897 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1990) (dismissing 
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appeal on jurisdictional grounds because the district court 
did not state its reasons for certification on the record); 
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d at 
364 (adopting the policy of requiring a written statement of 
reasons by the district court in support of its determination 
to certify a judgment as final under Rule 54(b)). Because 
the district court did not provide a written opinion outlining 
its reasons for its first certification of the judgment, we 
dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. As part of the 
second certification, however, the district court provided a 
written opinion explaining its reasons in great detail for 
granting the certification motion. Therefore, we can review 
the merits of the district court's certification decision. 
 
This case involves multiple claims among multiple 
parties. In addition to his claim against the Borough, 
Waldorf has direct claims against other defendants, and the 
Borough has cross-claims for contribution against these 
same parties. See generally Owens v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 
654 F.2d 218, 220 n.2 (3d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that 
contribution and indemnity claims are separate claims from 
the underlying complaint for purposes of a Rule 54(b) 
certification); Capital Transit Co. v. District of Columbia, 225 
F.2d 38, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ("Third party complaints 
seeking indemnity or contribution have in several instances 
been held to present a severable claim, capable of separate 
final adjudication under Rule 54(b) . . . ."). Thus, this case 
presents a situation in which a Rule 54(b) certification may 
be appropriate provided that in the unusual circumstances 
here the judgment is final and there is no just reason for 
delay. 
 
1. Finality 
 
A final judgment is "an ultimate disposition of an 
individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims 
action." Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 U.S. at 436, 76 S.Ct. at 
900; see also Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1638 ("Finality is defined 
by the requirements of 28 U.S.C. S 1291, which are 
generally described as `ending the litigation on the merits 
and leav[ing] nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.' " (citations omitted)). Although a district court 
has discretion in certifying a judgment for appeal under 
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Rule 54(b) "[t]he district court cannot, in its exercise of its 
discretion, treat as `final' that which is not`final' within the 
meaning of [28 U.S.C. S] 1291." Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 
U.S. at 437, 76 S.Ct. at 900. Thus, if the Borough has 
retained its right to assert an affirmative defense of 
comparative negligence against Waldorf, the reservation 
would prevent a Rule 54(b) certification in this case 
because the judgment would not be final. See Bohl v. 
Stamatakis Indus., Inc. (In re Lull Corp.), 52 F.3d 787, 788- 
89 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the presence of an 
affirmative defense precluded a finding of finality for the 
purposes of a Rule 54(b) certification); see also Trustees of 
the Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers & Warehouse Workers 
Union (Indep.) Pension Fund v. Central Transp., Inc. , 935 
F.2d 114, 116 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Rule 54(b) does 
not permit an "appeal when damages have been partially 
but not completely determined, or when the district court 
will revisit the issues."); Allis-Chalmers Corp., 521 F.2d at 
366 ("[I]n the absence of unusual or harsh circumstances, 
we believe that the presence of the counterclaim, which 
could result in a set-off against any amounts due and 
owing to the plaintiff, weighs heavily against the grant of 
54(b) certification."). 
 
The concern is that if the certification is allowed a 
defendant will have to pay money to a plaintiff that 
ultimately the plaintiff could be required to return if the 
defendant is successful in his or her defense. In fact, the 
New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which is applicable to 
Waldorf 's claim against the Borough, provides that if a 
plaintiff 's negligence is greater than a defendants' 
negligence, the plaintiff is precluded from recovery. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. S 59:9-4 (West 1992). Under this rule, depending 
on the outcome of the affirmative defense, an underlying 
judgment against the defendant could be invalidated. Thus, 
if the Borough can raise an affirmative defense of 
comparative negligence against Waldorf, the judgment from 
which Waldorf appeals is not final. 
 
We hold, however, that this judgment is final because we 
agree with the district court's determination that the 
Borough waived its affirmative defense of comparative 
negligence as a result of its stipulation of liability prior to 
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the second trial. In interpreting a stipulation, courts should 
consider its plain language and "the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the [s]tipulation which may 
explain" its meaning. Washington Hosp., 889 F.2d at 1302 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Boroughfirst 
proposed stipulating liability at a hearing before a 
magistrate judge in the context of considering a trial 
involving all of the defendants as to damages only. See app. 
at 276-77. Susan Sharko, the previous counsel for the 
Borough, explained to the magistrate judge that a trial 
limited to damages could not be held by consent because at 
least one defendant, Police Lt. Rego, was unwilling to 
stipulate to liability. See id. After this explanation, Sharko, 
acting for the Borough, made a clear and unequivocal 
stipulation of liability as to Waldorf: "The borough . . . has 
authorized me to advise the Court that they will not contest 
liability in this matter . . . ." Id. at 277. The only condition 
to the stipulation was that the court hold the damages trial 
first, to be followed by a separate liability trial. See id. 
 
The Borough argues that the provision for the separate 
liability trial demonstrates that it did not waive its 
affirmative defense of comparative negligence as to Waldorf. 
This argument is without merit. The plain language of the 
stipulation clearly does not reserve to the Borough any 
right to contest liability with respect to Waldorf. The 
assertion of an affirmative defense of comparative 
negligence is inconsistent with a stipulation of liability, 
because the thrust of the defense is the denial of liability to 
the same party in whose favor the stipulation of liability 
runs. Furthermore, given the New Jersey law which may 
deny recovery to a plaintiff depending upon his percentage 
of comparative negligence, the stipulation necessarily had 
to waive this affirmative defense if it was to be a stipulation 
of liability. Therefore, the Borough is attempting to recast 
the stipulation so that it was nothing more than a 
stipulation that it was negligent and that its negligence was 
a proximate cause of the accident. Such a limited 
stipulation would leave the liability question open as 
Waldorf 's comparative negligence could bar the action. 
 
Other persons present at the hearing when the Borough 
made the stipulation understood it as waiving the 
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Borough's affirmative defense of comparative negligence. In 
fact, while discussing the Borough's proposal, the 
magistrate judge stated that as a result of the stipulation, 
"the only rights that would accrue after [the damage trial] 
would be the rights between the various defendants to 
contribution . . . ." App. at 280; see also id. at 281 ("But in 
any event, Plaintiff will have 100 percent liability against 
the Borough, and the future liability trial, if it occurs at all, 
will only be to establish whether or not any one need make 
contribution." (comments of Steven Backfish, attorney for 
Police Lt. Rego)). Thus, without any objection by the 
Borough, the individuals involved at the hearing explained 
that the purpose of the liability trial would be to determine 
issues of contribution and not to disturb the Borough's 
stipulation of liability to Waldorf. Considering the 
circumstances surrounding the formulation of the 
stipulation and its plain meaning, we hold that the Borough 
waived its affirmative defense of comparative negligence by 
expressly, and without reservation, stipulating its liability 
to Waldorf.2 
 
We recognize that in its cross appeal the Borough argues 
that the district court erred by not permitting it to withdraw 
its stipulation. If the Borough could free itself from the 
stipulation, it could contest its liability to Waldorf, because 
the stipulation's waiver of the affirmative defense of 
comparative negligence no longer would have any force. In 
that circumstance, arguably the judgment in this case 
would not be final, because the liability trial could alter or 
undermine completely the damages judgment. However, as 
we will discuss below, because we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in binding the Borough to 
its stipulation, this possibility does not prevent the 
judgment from being final. 
 
The litigation between Waldorf and the Borough has been 
determined on the merits, and only the satisfaction of the 
judgment remains. The district court did not err in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because we hold that the Borough waived its affirmative defense, we 
do not reach the question of whether the assertion of that defense in a 
separate liability trial would violate New Jersey's ultimate outcome rule. 
See Roman, 413 A.2d at 327. 
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determining that the stipulation waived the Borough's 
affirmative defense of comparative negligence and, as we 
will discuss below, the court did not abuse its discretion in 
preventing the Borough from withdrawing the stipulation. 
Therefore, the judgment in this case is final. 
 
2. Just Reason for Delay 
 
In considering whether there is any just reason to delay 
entry of a final judgment, " `the proper role for the court of 
appeals is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts 
but to make sure that the conclusions derived from these 
weighings and assessments are judicially sound and 
supported by the record.' " Cemar Corp. , 897 F.2d at 123 
(citing Curtiss-Wright v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10, 
100 S.Ct. 1460, 1466 (1980)). We hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that there 
was no just reason to delay entry of a final judgment or to 
delay this appeal. When the court made its determination, 
Waldorf had endured three trials and two appeals and had 
waited more than 14 years without receiving any 
compensation for his injuries from this case. Any 
subsequent trial will not concern the issues of damages 
that have been fixed by the judgment; particularly 
inasmuch as we understand that all the parties agree that 
they are bound by the judgment with respect to the extent 
of damages. Thus, there is no risk that the issues decided 
at the damages trial will be reconsidered or that the 
damages determination will be moot.3 Furthermore, the 
Borough does not have any pending counterclaims or 
defenses against Waldorf that could reduce the award. The 
district court properly examined all the appropriate factors 
under our test as set forth in Allis-Chalmers  and did not 
abuse its discretion in determining that they weighed in 
favor of certifying the judgment as final thus allowing an 
immediate appeal. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In the circumstances, we see no reason to enter into a discussion of 
the preclusive effect of the judgment on parties other than Waldorf and 
the Borough. We simply note that it is not conceivable that any 
defendant would want to retry the damages issue and that Waldorf has 
had a full and fair trial on damages. 
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Based on the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's determination to certify this judgment asfinal 
pursuant to Rule 54(b). Therefore, we have jurisdiction and 
we now turn to the merits of Waldorf 's appeal and the 
Borough's cross appeal. 
 
III. BINDING EFFECT OF THE STIPULATION 
 
Although we typically would consider issues raised by an 
appellant before considering arguments raised by a cross 
appellant, we first will consider the issue the Borough 
raises in its cross appeal that its stipulation of liability is 
not binding. We reverse our usual order because of the 
significance of the issue on our jurisdiction, reference to 
which we made above. In its cross appeal, the Borough 
challenges the district court's decision precluding it from 
withdrawing its stipulation of liability to Waldorf. On this 
appeal and cross appeal, the Borough seeks to maintain 
the damage verdict but free itself of its full admission of 
liability to Waldorf. Thus, even though part of the condition 
of the stipulation has been carried out, the holding of a 
damage trial first by a separate jury, the Borough wishes to 
withdraw from its concession of liability to Waldorf and 
require that there be a full liability trial. Thus, to put it 
bluntly, the Borough wants it both ways -- the stipulation 
will be applied but only insofar as it is in its interest to 
apply it. 
 
As we have indicated, if the Borough is correct in its 
argument, the possibility of a reduction or elimination of 
the judgment in this case that could result from a full 
liability trial arguably might deny us jurisdiction over this 
appeal, because the judgment from which Waldorf appeals 
might not be regarded as final. Thus, the merits of the 
cross appeal and the jurisdictional issues are intertwined. 
We, however, will affirm the district court's denial of the 
Borough's motion to relieve it from the stipulation. Thus, 
our jurisdiction is secure. 
 
A. District Court Determination 
 
As we have indicated, the Borough unsuccessfully sought 
to withdraw its stipulation of liability to Waldorf prior to the 
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third trial. See Waldorf, 878 F. Supp. at 696. The district 
court held that a party may avoid a stipulation in three 
circumstances: mistake of law, express limitation, and 
manifest injustice. First, the court held that if a stipulation 
was entered into as a result of a mistake of law, a party 
should be entitled to relief. However, the court held that the 
Borough's decision to make the stipulation was merely 
tactical, rather than being engendered by a mistake of law. 
See id. at 692. Second, the court held that a party could be 
relieved of a stipulation if the stipulation expressly was 
limited "to a single trial and [was] phrased in conclusory, 
rather than evidentiary facts." Id. at 691-92. Examining the 
stipulation, the court held that the Borough did not limit 
the stipulation to a single trial, nor was the stipulation 
intended merely to narrow the issues in dispute. Rather, 
the court found that the Borough entered into the 
stipulation "as a tactical decision that the amount of 
damages awarded to Waldorf, if any, would be of a lesser 
quantum if the jury awarding the damages was not aware 
of the Borough's actions leading to its liability." Id. 
Therefore, the court held that the express limitation 
exception did not apply to the Borough's stipulation. 
Turning to the third exception, the court noted that"it is 
well-settled by decisional law in this and other circuits that 
a stipulation remains in effect unless the trial court finds 
that such vitality would result in `manifest injustice.' " Id. at 
690 (citations omitted). The court also stressed that district 
courts are given broad discretion to determine when there 
would be such injustice. See id. at 691. To determine 
whether there was manifest injustice in this case, the court 
examined the prejudice issue from the perspectives of the 
Borough, Waldorf, and the court. 
 
1. Prejudice to the Borough 
 
In determining whether the Borough would be prejudiced 
by binding it to its stipulation of liability, the court 
confronted the Borough's argument that "recently-reviewed 
evidence could negate the Borough's liability to Waldorf " on 
three different bases; thus, according to the Borough 
binding it to its stipulation would result in manifest 
injustice. Id. at 692-93. 
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The first evidence concerned Waldorf 's contention that 
the traffic light at the intersection of the accident was illegal 
when the Borough constructed it because it did not have 
two light "faces" in each direction as required by the 
Manual on Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways 
(June 1961) ("the 1961 Manual"). The State of New Jersey 
adopted the 1961 Manual on January 2, 1962. Based on 
"recently reviewed evidence," the Borough alleged that it 
could establish that the light was not illegal when it was 
constructed, because the 1961 Manual did not become 
binding on municipalities until September 1964, which was 
after the Borough constructed the light. To support this 
claim, the Borough produced a letter dated September 15, 
1964, from Gerald J. Driscoll, Chief of the Traffic Safety 
Service of the New Jersey Division of Motor Vehicles, which 
stated that "[a]s of this date, the Director of Motor Vehicles 
will process municipal applications for traffic signals . . . in 
accordance with the procedures described in the New 
Jersey Manual on Traffic Signal Application Procedures for 
Local Officials [`the New Jersey Manual'] .. . ." Id. at 693. 
According to the Borough, this letter evidenced that the 
1961 Manual was not in effect prior to September 1964. 
The district court rejected this interpretation because the 
New Jersey Manual cited in the letter differed from the 
1961 Manual which was at issue in this case. Thus, 
because the manuals are distinct, the court held that the 
Borough could not be prejudiced by the exclusion of this 
evidence. 
 
The Borough also claimed that it could produce evidence 
which would refute two other theories Waldorf advanced to 
establish its liability: that it failed to have a preventive 
maintenance plan that would have prevented the accident 
and that it failed to equip its police cars with emergency 
signs that would warn motorists of a malfunctioning traffic 
light. Under these theories, if the Borough had decided as 
an act of discretion not to adopt such a plan or purchase 
such signs, the Borough would be immune from liability 
under N.J. Stat. Ann. S 59:2-3(c) (West 1992). However, if 
the Borough simply failed to consider adopting the plans or 
purchasing the signs, then it could not assert an immunity 
defense. See Waldorf, 896 F.2d at 730, 737. In support of 
its motion to be relieved from the stipulation, the Borough 
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argued that it could produce testimony from a former 
Borough official that the Borough had considered both 
issues, but in the exercise of discretion, decided not to 
implement a preventive maintenance plan or purchase 
emergency warning signs. The court, however, noted that 
the Borough did not provide an affidavit of this unnamed 
official giving even "the barest outline of what that 
testimony might be" nor did the Borough explain why it did 
not offer this testimony at the original trial which included 
liability issues. Waldorf, 878 F. Supp. at 693-94. Therefore, 
the court held that the rejection of this evidence would not 
harm the Borough. Because the court determined that none 
of the recently reviewed evidence would undermine the 
Borough's stipulation of liability, the court held that 
binding the Borough to its stipulation would not result in 
a manifest injustice. 
 
Furthermore, the court noted that the Borough had not 
demonstrated that it exercised due diligence in advancing 
this "recently reviewed evidence." The court compared the 
situation to the granting of a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 60. Under that rule, a court may relieve a party from a 
final judgment or order based on "newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b)." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). While the Borough was not 
moving for a new trial, the court held that the situations 
were similar: new trial counsel for the Borough raised the 
issue of "new" evidence which the Borough's previous 
counsel did not discuss or bring forth. Furthermore, the 
Borough offered no explanation as to why this evidence 
could not have been presented during the first trial. 
Therefore, the court determined that because the Borough 
had failed to exercise due diligence with respect to this 
evidence, it should not be permitted to withdraw its 
stipulation. See Waldorf, 878 F. Supp. at 694. 
 
2. Prejudice to Waldorf 
 
In considering the impact of a withdrawal of the 
stipulation on Waldorf, the court held that Waldorf would 
suffer prejudice if the court granted the Borough's motion. 
The court noted that liability had not been an issue in the 
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case since the Borough made the stipulation in 1992. See 
id. at 694. If there was a trial on liability, there would be 
further delays in the case, because Waldorf would have to 
determine the availability of witnesses and marshal the 
evidence that pertained to an issue which the parties had 
not contested for years. Thus, the court held that relieving 
the Borough from its stipulation would prejudice Waldorf. 
See id. 
 
3. Prejudice to the Judicial System 
 
Finally, the court held that judicial resources would be 
burdened unduly if the Borough was permitted to withdraw 
its stipulation. The court stated that granting the motion 
would compromise the integrity of the judicial process, 
because the Borough then could take the case in a different 
direction merely because its new counsel might have tried 
the case differently than the previous counsel if he had 
been present at the outset of the case. The court recognized 
that concerns of judicial integrity underlie the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel; this doctrine precludes a party from 
asserting a position in a proceeding that is inconsistent 
with a previously asserted position. See id. at 695 (citing 
Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 
1992)). Based on these concerns of consistency and judicial 
integrity, the court held that allowing the Borough to chart 
a new path would prejudice the judicial system. 4 
 
Based on the consideration of all of the possible prejudice 
to the Borough, Waldorf, and the court, the district court 
held that binding the Borough to its stipulation would not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court also held that permitting the Borough to withdraw the 
stipulation would violate the law of the case doctrine and the mandate 
rule. Under the law of the case doctrine, once an issue has been decided, 
parties may not relitigate that issue in the same case. Here, the court 
held that the stipulation itself determined the issue of liability and 
removed that issue from judicial consideration. Furthermore, the court 
determined that our mandate in vacating the second judgment remanded 
the case "for a new trial on damages." Id.  According to the district 
court, 
permitting the parties to litigate an issue beyond damages would violate 
the mandate. Thus, these alternative bases provided support for binding 
the Borough to its stipulation. 
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result in a manifest injustice. See id. at 696. Thus, because 
there was no reason to free the Borough from its 
stipulation, the court denied the Borough's motion to 
 771<!>withdraw its stipulation of liability to Waldorf. 
 
Subsequently, but still before the damages trial, the 
Borough moved for relief from the stipulation on the 
grounds that it had authorized the stipulation in violation 
of the New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act ("the Act"), N.J. 
Stat. Ann. SS10:4-6 et seq. (West 1993). The district court 
denied this motion without opinion by order of August 31, 
1995. 
 
B. Discussion 
 
We review a district court's decision to bind a party to its 
stipulation under an abuse of discretion standard. See 
Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 
1991). In general, courts encourage parties to enter into 
stipulations to promote judicial economy by narrowing the 
issues in dispute during litigation. See TI Fed. Credit Union 
v. DelBonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st Cir. 1995). Allowing 
parties easily to set aside or modify stipulations would 
defeat this purpose, wasting judicial resources and 
undermining future confidence in such agreements. Thus, 
"[i]t is a well-recognized rule of law that valid stipulations 
entered into freely and fairly, and approved by the court, 
should not be lightly set aside." Kohn v. American Metal 
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 307 (3d Cir. 1972), partially 
overruled on other grounds en banc by Kershner v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 448 (3d Cir. 1982). However, 
in spite of the severe limitations placed on withdrawing 
stipulations, they are not absolute, and courts can grant 
parties relief from them. See, e.g., United States v. 
Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753, 757 (10th Cir. 1980). 
 
In support of its argument that the district court should 
have relieved it from the stipulation, the Borough advances 
three main contentions: (1) because the stipulation was 
conclusory in nature rather than factual, it was not binding 
on retrial; (2) manifest injustice would result if the court 
binds the Borough to its stipulation; and (3) the stipulation 
is invalid, because its authorization by the Borough violated 
the New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act. See N.J. Stat. 
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Ann. SS 10:4-6 et seq. (West 1993). We will address each 
argument in turn. 
 
1. Subsequent Proceedings 
 
Generally, a stipulation entered into prior to a trial 
remains binding during subsequent proceedings between 
the parties. See, e.g., Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(binding parties to a stipulation on retrial); United States v. 
Boothman, 654 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); 
United States v. Marino, 617 F.2d 76, 82 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(same). However, a stipulation does not continue to bind 
the parties if they expressly limited it to thefirst proceeding 
or if the parties intended the stipulation to apply only at 
the first trial. See Vattier v. Hinde, 32 U.S. 252, 266 (1833) 
(binding the parties upon remand of the case to an 
agreement consenting to the admission of certain testimony 
made prior to the reversal of the initial verdict, because the 
consent was not limited expressly); Hunt v. Marchetti, 824 
F.2d 916, 917 (11th Cir. 1987) (upholding the district 
court's withdrawal of a stipulation, because the district 
court determined that the parties intended to limit the 
stipulation to the first trial); United States v. Burkhead, 646 
F.2d 1283, 1285 (8th Cir. 1981) (binding the parties to a 
stipulation because it "was not by its terms limited to use 
in the first trial"). 
 
In this case, the stipulation was unilateral as Waldorf 
objected to it. Yet, we conclude that the cases involving 
agreements are persuasive here. After all, we see no reason 
why the Borough's position should be stronger because the 
court at its request imposed the stipulation on Waldorf 
than it would be if the parties had agreed on the 
stipulation. 
 
The Borough did not limit its stipulation to the trial then 
at hand. Instead, counsel for the Borough made a clear and 
unequivocal statement conceding its liability to Waldorf: 
"The borough has, after much consideration and soul- 
searching, has authorized me to advise the Court that they 
will not contest liability in this matter . . . ." App. at 277. 
Thus, rather than limiting the stipulation to the ensuing 
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trial, the Borough made an open-ended concession of 
liability. In an attempt to counter the lack of any limiting 
language contained in the stipulation, the Borough focuses 
on the nature of the stipulation itself. According to the 
Borough, because the stipulation was conclusory in nature 
rather than factual, it should apply only to the prior 
proceeding. 
 
While conclusory stipulations are entitled to less 
deference than evidentiary ones, see Coastal States Mktg., 
Inc. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1369 (5th Cir. 1983), the 
Borough's focus only on the nature of the stipulation is 
misplaced; limiting language or the intent to limit the 
agreement is also an important factor in considering the 
effect of a stipulation. For instance, Hunt v. Marchetti was 
a libel suit involving a newspaper that had published an 
article stating that the Central Intelligence Agency would 
implicate E. Howard Hunt in the 1963 assassination of 
President John F. Kennedy. See 824 F.2d at 916-17. Prior 
to the first trial between the parties, Liberty Lobby, the 
publisher of the newspaper, made a conclusory stipulation 
that it would not attempt to prove that Hunt was in Dallas, 
Texas, on the day of the assassination. See id.  at 917. After 
the completion of the first trial, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment and remanded the 
case for a new trial. See Hunt v. Liberty Lobby , 720 F.2d 
631 (11th Cir. 1983). Prior to this new trial, the district 
court ruled that the stipulation applied only at thefirst 
trial; and therefore, it would not bind the parties during the 
retrial of the case. See Hunt, 824 F.2d at 917. The critical 
factor for the district court in making this determination 
was not the conclusory nature of the stipulation, but rather 
the intent of parties to limit the stipulation to the first trial. 
See id. at 918. On further appeal, the court of appeals held 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
making this determination. See id. at 918; see also 
Wheeler, 935 F.2d at 1098 (holding that a district court 
may release a party from a conclusory stipulation if the 
stipulation is "limited expressly to a single trial"). 
 
Thus, while a court might be more inclined to free a party 
from a conclusory stipulation than a factual one, the 
parties' intention to limit or not limit a stipulation to only 
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one proceeding is the overriding factor. In this case, based 
on the explicit language of the Borough's stipulation, the 
district court determined that the Borough did not intend 
the stipulation to apply only to the first trial. See Waldorf, 
878 F. Supp. at 692. We will not disturb this finding, 
because we cannot say that the district court abused its 
discretion in making that determination, and even 
exercising plenary review we would reach the same 
conclusion. 
 
2. Manifest Injustice 
 
We now turn to the Borough's second argument, that 
"[i]n exceptional circumstances," courts will free a party 
from a stipulation to prevent a manifest injustice. Kohn, 
458 F.2d at 307; see also TI Fed. Credit Union , 72 F.3d at 
928. In determining whether there will be manifest injustice 
unless a party is relieved from a stipulation, courts have 
focused on such factors as: (1) the effect of the stipulation 
on the party seeking to withdraw the stipulation, see 
Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 870 F.2d 1198, 1206 
(7th Cir. 1989) (discussing the effect of the stipulation on 
the party seeking to withdraw the agreement); (2) the effect 
on the other parties to the litigation, see Logan Lumber Co. 
v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 855 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding 
that "suitable protective terms or conditions" should be 
imposed "to prevent substantial and real harm to the 
adversary" (citations omitted)); (3) the occurrence of 
intervening events since the parties agreed to the 
stipulation, see Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc., 820 F.2d 
at 1548 (denying relief from a stipulation because"nothing 
subsequently occurred to change the effect of the original 
stipulation"); and (4) whether evidence contrary to the 
stipulation is substantial, see Donovan v. Hamm's Drive 
Inn, 661 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a court 
could relieve a party from a stipulation upon a showing of 
substantial contrary evidence). 
 
In arguing that manifest injustice will result if it is not 
relieved from the stipulation, the Borough cites"recently 
reviewed evidence" that allegedly undermines a conclusion 
that the Borough is liable to Waldorf. Waldorf , 878 F. Supp. 
at 693. However, we cannot say that the district court 
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abused its discretion in determining that this evidence is 
insufficient to establish that a manifest injustice would 
result if the stipulation continued to bind the Borough. The 
Borough does not claim that the evidence is the product of 
an intervening event or that it previously could not have 
discovered the evidence. Instead, as the district court 
stated: "[The Borough] seeks to offer evidence that probably 
has been available to it since the time of the first trial." Id. 
at 694. Thus, this case does not involve circumstances that 
have changed dramatically so as to warrant granting it 
relief from the stipulation. 
 
Furthermore, the Borough's evidence itself affords no 
basis for granting it relief from the stipulation. The 1964 
Driscoll letter relates only tangentially to this case, because 
it does not address directly the 1961 Manual containing the 
set of regulations at issue in this case. After considering the 
Borough's arguments that the district court erred in its 
interpretation of the letter, we hold that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in determining that the letter 
did not provide any proof that the 1961 Manual had not 
been adopted prior to the Borough's installing the traffic 
light at the site of Waldorf 's accident. The Borough's 
argument is premised only on a brief mention of the 1961 
Manual in the later manual, the New Jersey Manual, 
discussed in the 1964 letter. This mention does not 
undermine Waldorf 's premise that New Jersey adopted the 
1961 Manual almost three years prior to the 1964 letter. 
 
Additionally, the Borough did not present any evidence or 
affidavits to the court to support its motion with regard to 
the other challenges to its liability. Based on this lack of 
relevant evidence, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in rejecting those arguments as a basis to 
overturn the stipulation. As the party seeking to free itself 
from the stipulation, the Borough had the obligation to 
provide the district court with competent evidence of the 
manifest injustice to it from binding it to the stipulation. 
 
When the Borough made the stipulation prior to the 
second trial, it had a full understanding of the legal rights 
it was relinquishing, and had clear knowledge of the 
consequences of its stipulation. In light of these 
circumstances, we cannot say that the district court 
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abused its discretion in determining that the evidence the 
Borough cited did not support a finding of manifest 
injustice. 
 
We also note that on this appeal the Borough seeks to 
free itself only from a portion of the stipulation. The 
Borough wishes to maintain the division of the trial into 
damage and liability phases with separate juries. Moreover, 
of course, it seeks to uphold the damages verdict that is the 
subject of this appeal. It undoubtedly believes, as would 
any reasonable person, that the verdict was favorable to it. 
 
Accordingly, of all of the conditions in the stipulation, the 
Borough wants to eliminate only its admission of liability to 
Waldorf. As the district court correctly noted,"the Borough 
made the stipulation as a tactical decision that the amount 
of damages awarded to Waldorf, if any, would be of a lesser 
quantum if the jury awarding the damages was not aware 
of the Borough's actions leading to its liability." Id. at 692. 
Having received what it conceived (probably correctly) was 
the advantage of a separate trial on damages, the Borough 
now seeks to withdraw the damaging part of the stipulation 
-- its admission of liability. However, a party may not be 
freed of the burdens of a stipulation while maintaining its 
benefits. See Kohn, 458 F.2d at 307 ("[W]here a stipulation 
has more than one material part, one such portion may not 
be deleted and the remainder of the stipulation enforced."); 
Emerick & Duncan Co. v. Hascy, 146 F. 688, 695 (9th Cir. 
1906); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations S 13 at 549 (1974). If we 
freed the Borough from the concession of liability aspects of 
the stipulation, we would be manifestly unfair to Waldorf. 
 
3. New Jersey Open Public Meetings Act 
 
Finally, the Borough argues that it should not be bound 
by the stipulation, because the Borough granted its 
attorney the right to make the stipulation in a proceeding 
held in violation of the New Jersey Open Public Meetings 
Act. This Act provides that, with exceptions, "all meetings of 
public bodies shall be open to the public at all times. 
Nothing in this act shall be construed to limit the discretion 
of the public body to permit, prohibit or regulate the act of 
participation of the public at any meeting." N.J. Stat. Ann. 
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S 10:4-12(a) (West 1993). Among these discretionary 
decisions specifically listed in the statute, the Act provides 
that the public may be excluded from discussions regarding 
pending litigation or involving the attorney-client privilege. 
See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 10:4-12b(7) (West 1993). However, for 
the public to be excluded, the public body first must adopt 
a resolution at a public meeting "(a) [s]tating the general 
nature of the subject to be discussed; and (b) [s]tating as 
precisely as possible, the time when and the circumstances 
under which the discussion conducted in closed session of 
the public body can be disclosed to the public." N.J. Stat. 
Ann. S 10:4-13 (West 1993). In this case, the Borough had 
discussions regarding the stipulation and ultimately voted 
to agree to the stipulation at a closed meeting. See app. at 
294. However, the Borough never adopted a resolution as 
provided under section 10:4-13, nor has it subsequently 
ratified the agreement in any of its open meetings. 
Therefore, the Borough argues that it authorized the 
stipulation in violation of the Act. 
 
Because our determination on this issue involves 
construction of the Act, we exercise plenary review. See, 
e.g., Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 460 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
hold that the Borough has waived any challenge it might 
have had under the Act.5 Section 10:4-15a of the Act 
(emphasis added) provides that: 
 
       Any action taken by a public body at a meeting which 
       does not conform with the provisions of this act shall 
       be voidable in a proceeding in lieu of prerogative writ in 
       the Superior Court, which proceeding may be brought 
       by any person within 45 days after the action sought 
       to be voided has been made public . . . . 
 
The New Jersey courts have enforced this 45-day time limit 
strictly. See, e.g., Township of Bernards v. State Dep't of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Waldorf contends that this Act provides a cause of action only to 
citizens and not municipalities, because the Act was intended to provide 
citizens with full access to all public meetings of governmental bodies 
and to protect against secrecy in public affairs. See N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 10:4-7 (West 1993). Because we hold that the Borough has waived any 
possible challenge under the Act, we need not reach the question of 
whether the Borough can maintain a challenge under the Act. 
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Community Affairs, 558 A.2d 1, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1989) (denying a challenge as untimely when it was 
filed nine months after the release of the minutes of a 
closed meeting); Jersey City v. State Dep't of Envtl. 
Protection, 545 A.2d 774, 783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988) (denying a challenge when the action was filed 60 
days after the public release of the information). The 45-day 
time limit of section 10:4-15a is mandatory; because the 
Borough did not challenge the approval of the stipulation 
within this 45-day time limit, its complaint is barred.6 
 
Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in binding the Borough to 
its prior stipulation. Indeed, we think that the Borough 
advances the Open Public Meeting Act argument with ill 
grace. Does the Borough believe that Waldorf and his 
counsel should have investigated to make sure that the 
Borough followed proper procedures when it tendered its 
stipulation? 
 
Moreover, the Borough's position now is fundamentally 
different from the position it took before the district court. 
The Borough initially sought relief from the stipulation prior 
to the third trial. If it had been successful then, the case 
would have been tried on all issues, and it would have lost 
the advantage of the stipulation. However, before this court, 
the Borough asks us to affirm the damages judgment and 
only void the stipulation as it relates to the liability trial. 
Thus, having received the benefit from its allegedly illegal 
conduct, the Borough only seeks to avoid the disadvantages 
resulting from that same conduct. 
 
We must say that we are disturbed by the Borough's 
argument for we do not subscribe to the theory that in 
litigation anything goes. The Borough remains bound to its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Even if we held that the 45-day limit could be relaxed in some 
circumstances, we would not relax it here. In this regard, we point out 
that the Borough was not in the position of an unknowing outsider 
unaware that an action had been taken. Moreover, it waited for years 
before it ever invoked the Act. In Jersey City , the court indicated that 
with respect to the 45-day time limitation "[c]onstructive notice is the 
standard." 545 A.2d at 783. The Borough, of course, had actual notice 
of its allegedly illegal conduct at the time of the violation. 
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admission of liability and the bifurcation of the trial. Thus, 
because the Borough's liability to Waldorf remainsfixed, 
the Borough's contention that it should be relieved from the 
stipulation of liability does not affect our jurisdiction over 
the present appeal.7 
 
IV. ADEQUACY OF THE JURY VERDICT 
 
A. Scope of the Appellate Record 
 
As a preliminary matter, Waldorf asks us to lodge a set 
of videotapes presented to the district court in the appellate 
record. One videotape depicts a day in Waldorf 's life during 
his stay at the Kessler Institute in 1983, and the second 
videotape depicts Waldorf undergoing one of his exercise 
regimens. Counsel for Waldorf showed these videotapes to 
the jury during trial, and he contends that they are relevant 
to our determination regarding the adequacy of the jury's 
verdict. We will grant Waldorf 's request and include these 
videotapes in the appellate record. 
 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that the 
record on appeal should consist of: "The original papers 
and exhibits filed in the district court, the transcript of 
proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the docket 
entries prepared by the clerk of the district court . . . ." Fed. 
R. App. P. 10(a). This definition not only includes items 
admitted into evidence, but also includes items presented 
to the district court and not admitted into evidence. See 
United States v. Burke, 781 F.2d 1234, 1246 (7th Cir. 
1986). The basic purpose behind the rule is to prevent 
parties from supplementing the record on appeal with items 
never presented to the district court. See 16A Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure  S 3956.1 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Of course, there are other problems with the Borough's position, such 
as judicial estoppel. Moreover, the Borough might have obtained a result 
at the second trial which it found satisfactory and it therefore never may 
have sought to avoid the stipulation. We also point out that if we had 
required the vacation of the stipulation, we might have ordered a new 
trial on damages. 
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Waldorf 's videotapes should be included in the appellate 
record, because he presented them to the district court and 
the jury saw them. See United States v. Sanchez- 
Valderuten, 11 F.3d 985, 987 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
a videotape introduced into evidence was part of record on 
appeal); Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 997 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a videotape shown to the jury and part of the 
district court record properly was considered to be part of 
the appellate record). Furthermore, these videotapes are 
especially relevant to the issues we are deciding, because 
they bear upon the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
the verdict, which Waldorf believes is inadequate. See 
LaFollette v. Savage, 63 F.3d 540, 544 (7th Cir. 1995), 
opinion supplemented by, 68 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1995). 
Therefore, we include these videotapes as part of the record 
of this appeal. 
 
B. Pain and Suffering 
 
Waldorf challenges the jury award of $2,500,000 for his 
pain and suffering as inadequate and against the weight of 
the evidence. In its opinion of February 26, 1996, the 
district court determined that the jury's award was 
adequate on its face, and thus Waldorf was not entitled to 
a new trial. See Waldorf, 916 F. Supp. at 426-29. The court 
found "no evidence that the jury was swayed by any 
passion or prejudice that might have made it disregard the 
weight of the evidence." Id, at 426. The court also 
recognized that the jury had an adequate opportunity to 
consider the size of the award through the testimony of 
Waldorf and his doctors, the jurors' observation of Waldorf, 
and the arguments of his counsel. 
 
The court then compared Waldorf 's pain and suffering 
verdict to verdicts in similar cases to gauge further its 
adequacy. The court first distinguished three cases Waldorf 
cited involving jury verdicts of over $10,000,000 for 
allegedly similar injuries: Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 
1991 WL 261659 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1991), aff 'd in part, 
rev'd in part, 981 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1992) (award of 
$10,000,000); Harrigan v. Ford Motor Co., 406 N.W.2d 917 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (award of $12,000,000); Firestone v. 
Crown-Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 
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1985) (award of $15,000,000). The court then discussed 
numerous similar cases with verdicts ranging from 
$1,000,000 to $3,510,000 for pain and suffering damages. 
See Waldorf, 916 F. Supp. at 427-29. Because the award to 
Waldorf was well within this range, the court determined 
that the jury award was not inadequate on its face, 
contrary to the evidence, or so low that it shocked the 
conscience of the court. Thus, the court denied Waldorf 's 
motion for a new trial based on the asserted inadequacy of 
the pain and suffering damages. 
 
We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion for 
a new trial for an abuse of discretion. See Cooper Distrib. 
Co. v. Amana Refrigerator, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 277 (3d Cir. 
1995). We will reverse a denial of a new trial only when "the 
verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence, thus 
making a new trial necessary to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice." Id.; see also Motter v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 883 
F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989) ("For the court to disturb a 
jury verdict, `the damages assessed by the jury must be so 
unreasonable as to offend the conscience of the Court.' " 
(citations omitted)). 
 
Waldorf was 24 years old at the time of his accident with 
a statistical life expectancy (aside from the effects of his 
injuries) of 52.67 years. However, because of his medical 
problems, his life expectancy is ten percent less than that 
of an average person. The jury heard much testimony 
regarding the results of the devastating accident on 
Waldorf: the 404 days in several hospitals and institutions; 
the halo brace screwed into his skull for five months; the 
extensive paralysis; the long and difficult rehabilitation; his 
constant pain; the required 24-hour attendant care for the 
rest of his life; and the medical problems from which he will 
suffer for the rest of his life such as muscle atrophy, 
neurogenic bladder, urinary tract infections, neurogenic 
bowel, sexual dysfunction, and muscle spasticity. 
 
Nevertheless, in challenging the verdict for pain and 
suffering, Waldorf does not cite to any specific indication 
that the jury disregarded the evidence. Instead, he relies on 
the size of the award as evidence of jury misconduct. 
However, juries are afforded broad discretion and great 
leeway in fixing fair and reasonable compensation to an 
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injured party; thus, Waldorf bears a heavy burden to 
demonstrate that the jury's award cannot stand. In 
attempting to meet this burden, Waldorf relies on a 
comparison of the verdict here with those in other cases. 
Although each case involves its own set of facts and 
circumstances, a review of awards in similar cases serves 
as a helpful guide in determining the reasonableness of a 
particular award. See Motter, 883 F.2d at 1230. 
 
Waldorf primarily relies on two cases to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of his award: Harrigan, 406 N.W.2d at 917 
(award of $12,000,000); and Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 99 
(award of $15,000,000). In Firestone, the Missouri Supreme 
Court upheld a $15,000,000 verdict to a 34-year old 
quadriplegic, Sally Firestone, as fair and reasonable. 
However, this award included a recovery for medical 
expenses and lost earnings, as well as for pain and 
suffering. See 693 S.W.2d at 109. In fact, testimony showed 
that the medical expenses and lost earnings totaled 
$7,076,771. See id. Thus, the verdict in Firestone is difficult 
to compare to the verdict for pain and suffering here. 
Furthermore, as the district court noted, Waldorf 's injuries 
do not seem as severe as those Firestone suffered. As a 
result of the collapse of a skywalk, she became a C-5 
quadriplegic and she had no movement below her shoulder 
level, except for some use of her bicep muscles. Among 
other injuries and problems, she also lost 80 percent of her 
blood, which necessitated "massive blood transfusions." Id. 
at 108. Firestone also broke both of her legs, and doctors 
implanted an intercranial monitoring device in her skull. 
Furthermore, she underwent surgery to stabilize her neck; 
she had a tracheotomy; and she needed a respirator to 
breath. Following surgery, Firestone developed bladder 
infections, pneumonia, and gastric hemorrhage. See id. at 
109. Both her neurosurgeon and doctor testified that her 
injuries were the worst they ever had seen. See id. Thus, 
because the verdict included factors beyond pain and 
suffering and because Firestone's injuries seem to have 
been more severe than Waldorf 's, the verdict in Firestone is 
not particularly instructive here. 
 
Similarly, the facts underlying the verdict in Harrigan are 
different from those in this case. In Harrigan , the Court of 
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Appeals of Michigan upheld a jury verdict of $12,000,000 
for a plaintiff who suffered from a C6-C7 quadriplegia 
injury. However, like the verdict in Firestone , this verdict 
does not specify that it was simply for pain and suffering; 
instead, this award seems to include medical expenses and 
other economic losses. Thus, the Harrigan verdict cannot 
reasonably be compared to the award in this case. 
 
As further support for his contention that the pain and 
suffering verdict was inadequate, Waldorf cites a number of 
cases awarding between $6,000,000 and $14,000,000 for 
pain and suffering by individuals who became quadriplegics 
as a result of an accident. See, e.g., Peterson v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., No. 90L15224, 1995 WL 537039 (Ill. Cir. 
Ct. 1995) (awarding $6,000,000 for pain and suffering to an 
individual who became a quadriplegic as a result of a tire 
failure); Roster v. Moulton, No. 88-10164, 1994 WL 873739 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1994) (awarding $10,000,000 for pain and 
suffering to an individual who became a quadriplegic when 
struck by a car); Martin v. Dellwood Foods Inc. , 
No.10090/90, 1991 WL 453940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991) 
(awarding $14,000,000 for pain and suffering to an 
individual who became a quadriplegic as a result of an 
accident). 
 
Notwithstanding these cases, we cannot hold that the 
district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial 
based on the size of the pain and suffering verdict. As the 
district court correctly noted, a significant number of other 
cases have resulted in verdicts originally or as remitted for 
substantially less for pain and suffering for similar injuries 
than the verdicts Waldorf cites. See, e.g., Heitzenrater v. 
United States, 930 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1991) (table) 
(reducing an award for pain and suffering to $1,000,000 for 
a psychiatric patient who fell seven stories and became a 
quadriplegic); Moore v. Subaru of Am., 891 F.2d 1445 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (awarding $1,500,000 for pain and suffering and 
medical expenses to an individual rendered a quadriplegic 
as a result of an automobile accident); Denham v. United 
States, 834 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding as 
adequate an award of $500,000 for pain and suffering of an 
individual with quadriplegia as a result of a diving 
accident); Siverson v. United States, 710 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 
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1983) (upholding an award of $1,000,000 for pain and 
suffering for a man who became a C6-C7 quadriplegic); 
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(upholding an award of $2,064,863 for expenses and for 
pain and suffering for a man who became a quadriplegic in 
an automobile accident); see also Waldorf, 916 F. Supp. at 
428-29 (listing further examples of similar verdicts). Thus, 
as these cases demonstrate, individuals rendered 
quadriplegics as a result of accidents have received 
significantly lower awards for pain and suffering than the 
award to Waldorf in this case. 
 
We also note that a very recent New Jersey state court 
case lends support to the district court's refusal to order a 
new trial on damages. In Green v. General Motors Corp., No. 
A-5756-95T2, 1998 WL 116851, ___ A.2d ___ (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Mar. 18, 1998), the court heard an appeal 
from a case which in some respects is remarkably similar 
to this case. In Green, a 24-year old man was rendered a 
quadriplegic in an accident on June 9, 1986. Thus, in 
Green, the accident was less than four years after the 
accident here and the injured party was the same age as 
Waldorf at the time of the injury. In Green, the jury 
awarded $4,000,000 for pain and suffering. While the 
parties in Green raised numerous issues in the appeal and 
cross appeal, they did not challenge the pain and suffering 
award. Of course, the Green verdict was considerably 
higher than that in this case. Yet the case demonstrates 
that even in these times in which we have grown 
accustomed to extremely high verdicts, a jury in New Jersey 
in a similar case has returned a verdict for pain and 
suffering for what some persons might think was a modest 
amount. 
 
In sum, the wide range of damages awarded in the cases 
brought to our attention demonstrates the inexact nature of 
juries' assessments of damages and the difficulty in using 
other cases as a comparison to test the adequacy of a 
particular award. Although Waldorf suffered catastrophic 
injuries as a result of the accident, the award of $2,500,000 
for pain and suffering does not seem shockingly 
inadequate. The determination of an appropriate award for 
pain and suffering is inherently subjective, and nothing in 
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the record indicates that the jury failed to evaluate the 
evidence in a fair and reasonable manner. Even though the 
award was for less than what Waldorf sought or what other 
plaintiffs may have received in other somewhat comparable 
cases, and indeed may have been less than we would have 
awarded if we made a de novo damages determination in 
this case, the award was within permissible limits for pain 
and suffering even for the devastating injuries which 
Waldorf suffered. In truth, it is very difficult to equate 
money with an injury of the character involved here. Thus, 
we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the request for a new trial based on the amount 
of the verdict for pain and suffering. 
 
C. Award for Past and Future Economic Loss 
 
Waldorf also challenges the jury's award of $195,000 for 
past lost earnings and $391,500 for future lost earnings as 
inadequate on four principal grounds: (1) insufficient 
evidence existed for the jury to determine that Waldorf 
failed to mitigate his damages; (2) the district court 
improperly qualified a witness as an expert; (3) counsel for 
the Borough made a number of improper references 
regarding a witness during the course of the trial; and (4) 
counsel for the Borough made an improper statement 
during his closing argument that misled the jury. We will 
consider each of these arguments in turn. 
 
1. Mitigation of Damages 
 
At trial, Conrad Berenson, an economist, testified on 
behalf of Waldorf that he would have earned $316,552 from 
the date of the accident to the time of trial, based on the 
assumption that he would have left college as of the time of 
the accident.8 Dr. Berenson concluded that Waldorf 's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Dr. Berenson based his earnings loss analysis on the earning potential 
of an individual with one to three years of college education. He used the 
analysis not only to calculate past earnings loss, but also to determine 
future earnings loss. Counsel for Waldorf pursued this strategy as a 
result of an earlier ruling from this court. See Waldorf, 896 F.2d at 742- 
43 (holding that it was an error for Waldorf to have presented testimony 
about future earnings based on attorney's salary). 
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future earnings would have ranged between $1,221,000 
and $1,339,000, based on an assumption that he would 
have worked until age 65. Therefore, the total earnings loss 
was between $1,537,000 and $1,655,000. The Borough did 
not introduce its own economic expert to counter this 
calculation. 
 
The jury awarded Waldorf a total of $586,500 for past 
and future earnings loss, most likely on the basis that 
Waldorf failed to mitigate his damages.9  Waldorf argues, 
however, that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to 
determine that Waldorf failed to mitigate his damages. 
 
At trial, the parties disputed whether Waldorf could work 
in spite of his injuries. A number of witnesses testified that 
only between 15 to 30 percent of all quadriplegics are able 
to return to work. See app. at 170-71, 238, 329. However, 
as the district court correctly noted, the jury heard 
testimony from some of these witnesses that Waldorf was 
capable of working. See Waldorf, 916 F. Supp. at 429. For 
instance, Waldorf 's own expert, Dr. Ragnarsson, who was 
a treating physician, agreed that Waldorf could return to 
work. On direct examination, Dr. Ragnarsson acknowledged 
that "technically [Waldorf] could hold a sedentary job of 
some sort." App. at 169. On cross-examination, he further 
testified: "I believe that he [Waldorf] can work." Id. at 172. 
 
Additionally, Waldorf 's vocational expert, Dr. David B. 
Stein, provided testimony that supported a conclusion that 
Waldorf had not mitigated damages. Dr. Stein administered 
aptitude and achievement tests to Waldorf, and based on 
the results, determined that he was a bright man with the 
ability to learn and with an intelligence in the high average 
range. See id. at 328. On cross-examination, Dr. Stein 
testified that he knew of no reason why Waldorf could not 
take college courses. See id. at 330. Based on this evidence, 
the district court held that the award for past and future 
lost earnings was not inadequate, even though it was well 
below Dr. Berenson's figures. See id. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Of course, it is possible that the jury simply did not accept Dr. 
Berenson's testimony as to Waldorf 's anticipated loss of earnings. We 
nevertheless focus on the mitigation point. 
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We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Waldorf 's motion for a new trial based 
on the asserted inadequacy of the verdict for past and 
future lost earnings. Although there was testimony that 
most quadriplegics cannot return to work after their 
injuries, the most relevant evidence here was the testimony 
regarding Waldorf 's ability to return to work. Based on the 
specific testimony regarding Waldorf 's own abilities and the 
jurors' opportunity to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, the jury reasonably could have determined that 
Waldorf failed to mitigate his damages by not working.10 
 
The jury awarded Waldorf $121,552 less in past earnings 
and $829,500 less in future earnings than the lowest 
figures provided by Dr. Berenson. But the jury heard 
evidence that Waldorf potentially could earn anywhere from 
$15,000 to $100,000 a year even with his injuries. See app. 
at 220-31. Thus, even if the jury accepted Dr. Berenson's 
basic figures, it could have reduced the award predicated 
on Waldorf 's failure to mitigate damages. Accordingly, the 
verdict it returned was justified by his ability to generate 
earnings as demonstrated at trial. The future earnings 
award is $29,625 a year less than Dr. Berenson's 
calculation; and the past earnings award averages $9,350 
a year less.11 Yet these reductions are not grossly out of line 
when the evidence regarding the job opportunities available 
to Waldorf is considered. Therefore, because the jury had 
sufficient evidence to consider the issue of mitigation and 
the ultimate award was not unreasonable, we hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in determining 
that the jury's award was adequate and in denying 
Waldorf 's motion for a new trial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. We are assuming without actually knowing that the jury found that 
Waldorf failed to mitigate his damages by not working. 
 
11. Even making a reasonable assumption that Waldorf did not begin 
working until well after the accident, the reduction by the jury based on 
a failure to mitigate his damages with regard to the past earnings award 
is not so unreasonable as to warrant a new trial. For instance, if the 
same $29,625 yearly figure presumably used to reduce the future lost 
earnings award is used to examine the past lost earnings award, the jury 
reduced Waldorf 's award for a failure to mitigate only over approximately 
the past four years. Given the length of time since the accident, to 
require mitigation over such a short time period is not unreasonable. 
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As we indicated above, Waldorf also sought an additur 
from the district court. However, inasmuch as we conclude 
that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Waldorf 's motion for a new trial based on the asserted 
inadequacy of the verdict, the district court had no reason 
to grant an additur. In the circumstances we do not 
address the additur issue further. 
 
2. Qualification of Dennis Rizzo 
 
Waldorf also argues that he should receive a new trial 
because the district court improperly qualified Dennis 
Rizzo, who testified for the Borough at trial, as an expert 
witness on vocational rehabilitation. Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence: 
 
       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
       an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
       education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
       or otherwise. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Waldorf does not dispute that vocational 
rehabilitation is a proper subject for expert testimony; 
instead, he questions whether Rizzo was qualified to testify 
as an expert in that area. For a court to qualify a witness 
to testify as an expert, Rule 702 requires the witness to 
have "specialized knowledge" regarding the area of 
testimony. The basis of this specialized knowledge"can be 
practical experience as well as academic training and 
credentials." American Tech. Resources v. United States, 
893 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1990); Hammond v. International 
Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[U]nder 
Rule 702, an individual need possess no special academic 
credentials to serve as an expert witness. . . .`[P]ractical 
experience as well as academic training and credentials 
may be the basis of qualification (as an expert witness).' " 
(citation omitted)). We have interpreted the specialized 
knowledge requirement liberally, and have stated that this 
policy of liberal admissibility of expert testimony"extends to 
the substantive as well as the formal qualification of 
experts." See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 
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717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994). However, "at a minimum, a 
proffered expert witness . . . must possess skill or 
knowledge greater than the average layman . . . ." Aloe Coal 
Co. v. Clark Equip. Corp., 816 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 
Even though we apply Rule 702 liberally, we have not 
pursued a policy of qualifying any proffered witness as an 
expert. For instance in Aloe Coal Co., we held that a district 
court abused its discretion in allowing a tractor sales 
representative to testify as an expert regarding the cause of 
a tractor fire. In making this determination we stated: 
 
       Drewnoski [the expert witness] was not an engineer. He 
       had no experience in designing construction 
       machinery. He had no knowledge or experience in 
       determining the cause of equipment fires. He had no 
       training as a mechanic. He never operated construction 
       machinery in the course of business. He was a 
       salesman, who at times prepared damage estimates. 
 
816 F.2d at 114 (citations omitted). Therefore, we held that 
the witness was not sufficiently qualified to give an expert 
opinion on the issue of causation. 
 
Numerous district court opinions within this circuit 
provide examples of witnesses disallowed from providing 
expert testimony. For example, in Diaz v. Johnson Matthey, 
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 358, 373 (D.N.J. 1995), the plaintiff 
alleged that working conditions at his former job caused 
him to develop platinum salt allergies. In support of this 
allegation, the plaintiff produced a doctor who sought to 
testify about his condition and the possible long-term 
health effects of the condition. The district court held that 
the doctor was not qualified to testify that the plaintiff had 
a platinum salt allergy because his experience with such 
patients was limited and he had only a limited familiarity 
with the literature regarding the illness. See id.; see also 
Higgenbotham v. Volkswagenwerk Anktiengesellschaft , 551 
F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that an 
investigating officer was not qualified to offer an expert 
opinion regarding the movement of a person inside a 
vehicle during an accident because the officer only had 
minimal training in accident reconstruction, physics, and 
the movement of bodies), aff 'd, 720 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1983) 
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(table); Globe Indem. Co. v. Highland Tank & Manuf. Co., 
345 F. Supp. 1290, 1291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (holding that 
neither an electrical engineer nor an industrial hygienist 
was qualified to testify as an expert regarding the design of 
a molasses storage tank where neither had any experience 
or knowledge in the field of storage tank design), aff 'd, 478 
F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973) (table). 
 
However, in considering the qualification of witnesses as 
experts, we stress that ordinarily an otherwise qualified 
witness is not disqualified merely because of a lack of 
academic training. For instance, in Hammond the district 
court determined that a witness could testify as an expert 
regarding a rollover protective structure on a tractor even 
though he did not have a formal degree in engineering or 
physics. See 691 F.2d at 653. In spite of his lack of formal 
training, the witness had experience in the field, because he 
worked selling automotive and mechanical equipment, 
including agricultural equipment, and he taught automobile 
repair and maintenance at a high school. We upheld his 
qualification as an expert, stressing that his practical 
experience was sufficient. See id. 
 
Furthermore, in Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 
87-88 (3d Cir. 1979), we held that an engineer who had 
designed safety equipment could testify as an expert 
regarding whether unguarded elevator control buttons were 
a design defect, even though he had no experience with 
such devices on elevators. We held that the expert's 
generalized knowledge about machine safety sufficiently 
qualified him as an expert. See also Davis v. United States, 
865 F.2d 164, 168 (8th Cir. 1988) (permitting the testimony 
of a public health investigator regarding the probabilities of 
transmitting gonorrhea despite his lack of medical training, 
because the expert had practical experience regarding such 
cases); Circle J Dairy, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prod., 
Inc., 790 F.2d 694, 700 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
witness could testify as an expert regarding the feed-related 
health problems of dairy cattle despite a lack of academic 
qualifications because of his practical experience in the 
area). 
 
The district court qualified Rizzo to testify as a vocational 
expert in spite of his lack of any formal training in that 
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field, and notwithstanding that his educational training 
culminated in a master's degree in sociology and social 
organization from Rutgers University in 1973. But his 
experience was sufficient to qualify him as an expert. After 
obtaining his degree, Rizzo began working for the State of 
New Jersey in the Division of Mental Retardation as a social 
worker. He worked as a case manager assisting mentally 
retarded individuals in "meeting their life needs" and 
assisting families in meeting the life needs of their mentally 
retarded children. See app. at 207-08. From 1980 to 1983, 
Rizzo operated a non-profit corporation whose purpose "was 
to expand the availability of services in the community to 
individuals with disabilit[ies]." Id.  at 208. From 1983 to 
1986, Rizzo was employed in a marketing job selling 
consumer products on college campuses. In 1986, Rizzo 
was unemployed for nine months, but then began to work 
as a social worker at the North Princeton Developmental 
Center. He soon became a supervisor of an 80 to 84 bed 
care unit which housed individuals "who had severe 
mobility impairment, severe psychiatric involvement,[and] 
a variety of different disabilities . . . ." Id. at 210. He worked 
in this facility for four years. 
 
In 1990, Rizzo began working for the State of New Jersey 
in the Developmental Disabilities Council as a contract 
manager. In 1991, he became involved in the Council's 
administration of a million dollar loan pool to assist 
disabled New Jersey residents in starting their own 
businesses. See id. at 210-11. In that capacity, Rizzo 
evaluated the capacity of disabled individuals to accomplish 
specific employment opportunities. Rizzo also testified that, 
through the course of his employment, he became familiar 
with studies on the work that quadriplegics can perform. 
See id. at 219. Furthermore in his job experience, Rizzo 
utilized the New Jersey Department of Labor Statistics and 
the New Jersey Job Listing Book, which indicate 
employment opportunities available in various job 
categories in New Jersey. See id. at 229, 343. Thus, based 
on his experience and his familiarity with the literature in 
the field, the district court held that Rizzo was qualified 
properly as a vocational expert. The court said that"[w]hile 
his formal credentials may be a little thin, he certainly had 
sufficient substantive qualifications to be considered an 
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expert under the liberal standard of Rule 702." Waldorf, 
916 F. Supp. at 430. 
 
Waldorf has a heavy burden in challenging this decision 
because, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not 
substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court 
regarding the admission or exclusion of expert testimony. 
See Aloe Coal Co., 816 F.2d at 114. Of course, an abuse of 
discretion means much more than that the appellate court 
disagrees with the trial court. Rather, a trial court's 
determination whether to admit or exclude expert testimony 
will be upheld "unless manifestly erroneous." Id. 
 
We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in qualifying Rizzo as an expert witness. Even 
though Rizzo did not possess formal academic training in 
the area of vocational rehabilitation, he did have experience 
in the field through his employment at the Developmental 
Disabilities Council in attempting to provide jobs for 
disabled individuals. During this time, Rizzo also became 
familiar with the relevant literature in the field. Even if his 
qualifications are, as the district court described, "a little 
thin," he has substantially more knowledge than an average 
lay person regarding employment opportunities for disabled 
individuals. In the circumstances, we cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion in determining that 
Rizzo possessed the minimum qualifications necessary to 
testify as an expert. 
 
Whatever doubts the district court might have had 
regarding Rizzo's qualifications, it is important to note that 
"[o]nce the trial court has determined that a witness is 
competent to testify as an expert, challenges to the expert's 
skill or knowledge go to the weight to be accorded the 
expert testimony rather than to its admissibility." Fox v. 
Dannenberg, 906 F.2d 1253, 1256 (8th Cir. 1990); see also 
Knight, 596 F.2d at 88. The jury heard all of the testimony 
regarding Rizzo's qualifications, and thus the jurors could 
evaluate the weight to give to Rizzo's expert opinions. 
Therefore, because the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in qualifying Rizzo as an expert witness, we will 
uphold its denial of Waldorf 's motion for a new trial.12 In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Waldorf also contends that Rizzo had no basis to testify about 
rehabilitation technology available in Florida where Waldorf now resides. 
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short, this situation is one within the discretion of the 
court. Thus, while we do not doubt that we would not have 
disturbed the court's ruling if it had excluded Rizzo as an 
expert witness, we cannot disturb the court's ruling 
qualifying him. As is so often the case in discretionary 
rulings involving qualification of witnesses or admission of 
evidence, we will affirm a reasoned decision by a district 
court regardless of how we might have decided the issue if 
we had been making the original determination. 
 
3. Remarks of Defense Counsel in Summation 
 
As another basis for a new trial, Waldorf asserts that the 
defense counsel made an improper argument during his 
closing remarks. During his closing argument, counsel for 
the Borough stated that Waldorf would be able to obtain 
free job training for the rest of his life, a service that 
counsel termed "occupational therapy." See  app. at 243. 
However, earlier in the trial, Dr. Ragnarsson had stated 
that this term did not pertain to job training, but rather 
referred to training in activities of daily living. See Waldorf, 
916 F. Supp. at 432. Waldorf alleges that the Borough's 
misuse of the term "occupational therapy" led the jury to 
award less in economic damages than it otherwise would 
have awarded. In addressing this argument, the district 
court noted that even though the use of the term by the 
Borough was "sloppy and incorrect," it did not unduly 
prejudice the jury. Id. 
 
"Our standard of review with respect to the award of a 
new trial for prejudicial conduct by counsel is deferential. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The district court determined that Rizzo properly based this testimony on 
a letter he received from a vocational expert in Florida. See Waldorf, 916 
F. Supp. at 431. Under the standards for expert testimony, Rizzo was 
not required to have personal knowledge regarding every job opportunity 
available. "[A]n expert opinion may be based on any type of evidence 
commonly used by experts in the field." Rogers v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 
922 F.2d 1426, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1991); see also  Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
Because Rizzo based his testimony on a reliable source in the field of 
vocational rehabilitation, the district court did not err in permitting 
Rizzo 
to testify regarding rehabilitation technology in Florida. 
 
                                47 
  
. . . Because the trial judge was present and able to judge 
the impact of counsel's remarks, we defer to his assessment 
of the prejudicial impact." Fineman v. Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 207 (3d Cir. 1992). We hold that 
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a 
new trial based on the Borough's counsel's remarks. Courts 
generally have given attorneys great latitude in their 
arguments; we have held that "not all improper remarks 
will engender sufficient prejudice to mandate the granting 
of a new trial. Our test is whether the improper assertions 
have made it `reasonably probable' that the verdict was 
influenced by prejudicial statements." Id.  at 208 (citations 
omitted). Although counsel for the Borough admittedly 
misused the term "occupational therapy," the idea behind 
his argument did have a basis in the record. 
 
The Borough introduced testimony that Florida, where 
Waldorf now lives, and New Jersey, both offer rehabilitation 
service systems that assist disabled individuals to locate 
jobs through the administration of aptitude tests, the 
provision of job locators, and the adaptations of workplace 
environments. All of these services are government funded. 
See app. at 344-45. Therefore, the Borough's counsel had 
a basis in the record to argue that Waldorf had free services 
available to assist him in locating a job, even though the 
specific term the Borough used to describe such services 
was incorrect. We hold that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in denying a new trial based on this minor 
misstatement by the Borough's counsel, because it is not 
"reasonably probable" that this misstatement influenced the 
verdict. Indeed, the comment seems inconsequential in the 
overall context of this case. 
 
4. Improper Use of the Testimony of James Pascuiti 
 
As a further basis for a new trial, Waldorf alleges that the 
Borough misused the testimony of its vocational expert, 
James Pascuiti, who is also a quadriplegic, by improperly 
trying to compare Pascuiti to Waldorf. Waldorf complains of 
two specific instances: (1) during Pascuiti's testimony, 
counsel for the Borough questioned him about his wedding 
ring; and (2) during the Borough's closing argument, 
counsel for the Borough improperly compared Pascuiti to 
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Waldorf. These allegations also involve potentially improper 
behavior by counsel; therefore we review the district court's 
decision denying a new trial by reason of them under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See Fineman, 980 F.2d at 
207. 
 
a. Redirect Examination of Pascuiti 
 
At the conclusion of his redirect examination of Pascuiti, 
counsel for the Borough posed the following question: "Just 
one last question: What is that ring you are wearing on 
your left hand?" App. at 241. Before Waldorf 's counsel 
could object, Pascuiti responded: "[A] wedding band." Id. 
After Waldorf 's counsel objected, the district court 
"promptly issued a curative instruction. It said:`I ask the 
jury to disregard whether he wears a wedding band is 
immaterial to the case . . . I specifically instruct you 
whether this witness wears a wedding band is wholly 
irrelevant to the issues in this case.' " Waldorf, 916 F. 
Supp. at 431. Based on this immediate instruction, the 
district court held that the remark did not prejudice 
Waldorf, and did not confuse the jury. See id.  
 
We hold that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in holding that this remark did not influence the 
jury unduly. The district court immediately issued an 
instruction to the jury to disregard the question and the 
answer. The court also repeated this instruction to the jury 
during its charge, and told it not to use the reference in any 
way to decide the case. See app. at 348. Thus, although 
this irrelevant exchange occurred between counsel for the 
Borough and Pascuiti, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in holding that its curative instructions were 
sufficient to prevent any prejudice to Waldorf. After all, 
there is no reason to believe that the jury did not follow the 
instructions. See United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
 
b. Closing Argument by the Borough 
 
Waldorf also maintains that the Borough's counsel 
improperly compared Waldorf and Pascuiti in his 
 
                                49 
  
closing argument by repeatedly describing Pascuiti's 
accomplishments after he became a quadriplegic. While 
playing football in high school in 1963, Pascuiti became a 
C6-C7 quadriplegic, the same injury that Waldorf suffered. 
In 1964, Pascuiti enrolled in Seton Hall University where he 
received a bachelor's degree in 1968. He received a master's 
degree from the same school in 1971, and later became 
certified as a rehabilitation counselor. See  app. at 244-46. 
During his closing argument, counsel for the Borough 
referred to these facts in the context of Waldorf 's failure to 
seek any kind of employment or schooling following his 
accident. However, because Waldorf did not object to these 
remarks when they were made, the district court held that 
Waldorf had waived any objection to them. Furthermore, 
the court stated that even if Waldorf had objected, it would 
have permitted the statements, because "[t]he Borough was 
simply restating information that had already been 
presented to the jury." Waldorf, 916 F. Supp. at 431. 
 
As the district court correctly noted, it is clear that a 
party who fails to object to errors at trial waives the right 
to complain about them following trial. See Murray v. 
Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding 
that "[c]ounsel's failure to object precludes him from 
seeking a new trial on the grounds of the impropriety of 
opposing counsel's closing remarks."). Waldorf failed to 
object at trial; therefore, we hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying Waldorf 's motion for a 
new trial.13 
 
V. COLLATERAL SOURCE SET-OFF 
 
In its cross appeal, the Borough argues that the district 
court misapplied New Jersey law and improperly limited the 
amount of a collateral source set-off to which it was 
entitled. Under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act: 
 
       If a claimant receives or is entitled to receive benefits 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Borough contends that the district court improperly excluded 
certain evidence but it raises this issue only in the event that we 
otherwise grant a new trial as it asks us to uphold the damages verdict. 
Thus, we do not consider this point further. 
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       for the injuries from . . . any other source . . . such 
       benefits shall be disclosed to the court and the amount 
       thereof which duplicates any benefit contained in the 
       award shall be deducted from any award against a 
       public entity . . . . 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann. S 59:9-2(e) (West 1992). As part of the Tort 
Claims Act, this section applies to cases involving public 
entities in New Jersey. Although the Tort Claims Act was 
intended to establish a structure to control the liability of 
public entities, the purpose behind this particular section is 
"to prohibit the receipt of duplicate benefits by a claimant 
filing suit under the act." Section 59:9-2(e) cmt. Since his 
accident, Waldorf has received social security disability 
benefits. The Borough maintains that under section 59:9- 
2(e) it not only should obtain a set-off for these amounts 
already received by Waldorf, but also should obtain a set-off 
for any social security disability payments that Waldorf will 
receive in the future. 
 
In an order dated October 10, 1996, the district court 
granted the Borough's motion seeking a set-off against the 
jury's award in the amount of $80,559, which "represents 
the amount of social security disability benefits paid to 
Plaintiff from the date of the accident to the present date." 
App. at 36. However, the district court denied the 
Borough's motion for a set-off for future social security 
disability benefits that Waldorf might receive. The Borough 
contends that this limitation on the set-off was improper 
under section 59:9-2(e). Because the district court's 
decision rested on its construction of section 59:9-2(e), our 
review of the decision is plenary. See, e.g., Smith, 124 F.3d 
at 460-61. 
 
In deciding questions of state law, we look to the 
decisions of courts of that state for guidance. See, e.g., 
Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 462-65 (3d 
Cir. 1996). Although New Jersey courts have acknowledged 
that social security benefits are a potential collateral source 
payment subject to set off under N.J. Stat. Ann.S 2A:15-97 
(West Supp. 1997), applicable in general in personal injury 
and wrongful death actions, see, e.g., Thomas v. Toys `R Us, 
Inc., 660 A.2d 1236, 1244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), 
we are not aware of any court in New Jersey which has 
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addressed directly the issue of the set-off of future social 
security disability benefits under section 59:9-2(e) in a 
published opinion. Section 2A:15-97, like section 59:9-2(e), 
provides for collateral source set-off for any monies or 
benefits that a plaintiff "receives or is entitled to receive 
. . . ." The purpose behind this section is the same as 
section 59:9-2(e): to eliminate double recoveries by 
plaintiffs. See N.J. Assembly Insurance Comm. Statement, 
L. 1987, c. 326, S 1, N.J. Senate No. 2708 (Sept. 1, 1987); 
Senate Judiciary Comm. Statement, L. 1987, c. 326S 1, 
N.J. Senate No. 2708 (Oct. 30, 1986); Sponsor Statement, 
L. 1987, c. 326, S 1, N.J. Senate No. 2708 (Oct. 27, 1986). 
Because the collateral source provisions are so similar and 
the purposes behind the two sections are the same, we can 
infer from New Jersey courts' interpretation of section 
2A:15-97 what the proper interpretation of section 59:9-2(e) 
should be. 
 
The leading case applying the collateral source set-off of 
future social security benefits under section 2A:15-97 is 
Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1996). In Parker, a pedestrian who was struck by a van 
received an award in court that included an amount for 
past and future lost income. The Appellate Division 
considered whether the court should set off his future 
social security disability payments as a collateral source 
under section 2A:15-97. The court held that this section 
required that the court deduct future benefits from the 
judgment, because the statute clearly requires the 
deduction of benefits that the plaintiff "is entitled to 
receive." Parker, 677 A.2d at 1162. Furthermore, such a 
deduction was warranted because "[t]he statute's purpose 
is to prevent double recovery, thereby giving some relief 
from the increasing costs of liability insurance." Id. 
 
The court stressed, however, that a "plaintiff 's 
entitlement to future benefits must be determined and fixed 
when judgment is entered on the verdict." Id.  These benefits 
are those to which a "plaintiff has an established, 
enforceable legal right when judgment is entered and which 
are not subject to modification based on future 
unpredictable events or conditions. In other words, future 
collateral benefits are deductible only to the extent that 
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`they can be determined with a reasonable degree of 
certainty.' " Id. at 1162-63 (quoting Buchman v. Wayne 
Trace Local Sch. Dist., 652 N.E.2d 952, 958 (Ohio 1995)). 
Applying this rule, the Parker court recognized that "there 
was substantial evidence at trial that plaintiff can be 
gainfully employed, though not at the salary he earned 
prior to the injury." Id. at 1163. Thus, the court determined 
that the plaintiff 's social security payments were uncertain 
and not determinable at the time of judgment, because of 
such factors as "his [future] condition or[potential] 
employability." Id. Consequently, it did not allow the set-off 
for them. 
 
Applying this precedent here, we conclude that the 
district court did not err in determining that the Borough 
was not entitled to a set-off for future social security 
benefits that Waldorf might receive. Social security 
disability payments are available only to individuals who, 
because of a disability, are not capable of working. See 42 
U.S.C. S 423(a) (providing that certain individuals who are 
disabled are entitled to benefits); see also  42 U.S.C. 
S 423(d) (defining "disability" as impairments that "are of 
such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous 
work but cannot" do certain other work). Furthermore, 
section 423(f) provides that a recipient of social security 
disability benefits may have those benefits terminated if 
substantial evidence demonstrates that "[a]lthough the 
individual has not improved medically, he or she is 
nonetheless a beneficiary of advances in medical or 
vocational therapy . . . and [t]he individual is now able to 
engage in substantial gainful activity" or if such evidence 
demonstrates that "[a]lthough the individual has not 
improved medically, he or she has undergone vocational 
therapy (related to the individual's ability to work), and 
[t]he individual is now able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 423(f). Thus, the social security 
statute clearly provides that disability benefits can be 
terminated if a recipient does not remain under a disability 
that prevents him from working. 
 
The Borough presented the expert testimony of Rizzo and 
Pascuiti, both of whom testified that Waldorf is capable of 
obtaining and holding employment. In addition, Waldorf 's 
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own experts agreed that Waldorf was capable of working. In 
light of this testimony, as the court held in Parker with 
respect to the plaintiff there, we hold that it is uncertain 
whether Waldorf will continue to receive his disability 
benefits. Therefore we will affirm the district court's 
determination that the Borough may receive a set-off only 
in the amount of $80,559.14 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Having determined that we have jurisdiction over the 
present appeal and cross appeal, we will affirm the orders 
of the district court and uphold the judgment in favor of 
Waldorf. In particular, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in determining that the award was not 
unreasonably low. Furthermore, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Waldorf 's motion for a new 
trial based on the jury's consideration of mitigation 
evidence, the qualification of Rizzo as an expert, or the 
conduct of opposing counsel. We also hold that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in binding the Borough to 
the stipulation it entered into prior to the second trial, nor 
did the district court err in fixing the collateral source set- 
off that the Borough could receive. 
 
Although the judgment in this case might not have met 
Waldorf 's expectations, and, indeed, may have been less 
than we would have awarded if we had fixed the damages 
de novo on the basis of the record, it will provide a small 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. We also reject the Borough's argument that the appropriate date for 
determining when such benefits are fixed and determinable should not 
have been the date of the district court's order regarding this issue, but 
rather should be fixed as of the date that this litigation finally 
concludes, 
presumably when a final verdict is rendered in the liability trial. As we 
have stated in this opinion, the Borough does not have any remaining 
claims or defenses against Waldorf to advance in any future liability 
trial, and the judgment against the Borough is final. The district court 
cannot and should not retain jurisdiction over Waldorf 's claim against 
the Borough merely to continue to deduct collateral source set-off 
benefits. The aspect of this litigation with respect to the Borough's 
liability to Waldorf should be at an end even if the case otherwise 
continues. Therefore, we reject the Borough's argument for a continuing 
set-off. 
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measure of comfort for the horrific injuries that he received 
over 15 years ago, and it also will represent some measure 
of closure to this legal odyssey that began over 13 years ago.15 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the 
district court. 
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15. We understand that as of this time only the liability of the Borough 
has been fixed. In response to our inquiry at oral argument, counsel for 
the Borough indicated that this litigation will go on with respect to 
fixing 
responsibility among the defendants. Yet we cannot help but wonder 
whether now that the overarching issues in this case are resolved, the 
parties cannot settle the remaining issues so that this litigation which 
is 
over 13 years old can be ended. 
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